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Abstract: This is the first of two articles discussing Missouri’s requisitions to 
extradite Joseph Smith to face criminal charges and the Prophet’s recourse to 
English habeas corpus practice to defend himself. In this article, the author 
presents research rejecting the suggestion that the habeas corpus powers of 
the Nauvoo City Council were irregular and explains why the idea that the 
Nauvoo Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction to consider interstate habeas 
corpus matters is anachronistic. In the second article, the author analyzes 
the conduct of Missouri Governor Thomas Reynolds in relation to the 
requisitions for Joseph Smith’s extradition. Even by the standards of the day, 
given what he knew, his conduct was unethical.
Former Illinois Governor Thomas Ford and the Warsaw Signal editor Thomas Sharp, together with Sharp’s correspondents, popularized 
the view that the use Joseph Smith and the Latter-day Saints made of the 
English writ of habeas corpus during the Nauvoo period was suspect.1 In 
fact, it was Missouri’s willingness to pursue Joseph Smith’s extradition, 
even though it had dismissed the underlying indictments, that forced 
 1. Thomas Ford, History of Illinois, From Its Commencement as a State in 1818 
to 1847 (Chicago: S.C. Griggs and Co, 1854), 265. Note that Governor Ford had 
criticized the Mormon use of powers under the Nauvoo Charter in his letter to the 
Saints dated 22 June 1844 which was published by Thomas Sharp in the Warsaw 
Signal on 29 June 1844.
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Smith’s recourse to the now-misunderstood English habeas corpus 
process and seeded the resentment of later enemies.2
In his History of Illinois in 1854, Ford wrote that the Nauvoo 
Charter’s provisions were “unheard of, and anti-republican in many 
particulars; and capable of infinite abuse by a people disposed to abuse 
them.”3 Though he had formerly held office as an Illinois Supreme Court 
Justice,4 objectivity was not to be expected from Governor Ford. He had 
promised Joseph Smith safe conduct if he went to Carthage5 and was 
thus considered responsible for the martyrdom by the Latter-day Saints.
Thomas Sharp quoted Charles Foster in his newspaper, suggesting 
that “Joseph’s escape from arrest through habeas corpus writs in the 
Nauvoo municipal court,”6 was just one example of “galling oppression”7 
by the Mormon majority in Nauvoo. Sharp began his relationship with 
the Mormons as a “neutral observer”8 who “reported the issuance of the 
Nauvoo Charter without editorial comment” in January 1841,9 but he 
became a Mormon-hater within a few months, largely because of the 
Mormon reaction to his criticism of John C. Bennett’s appointment 
 2. See, for example, Jeffrey N. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-
Century Mormonism, Joseph Smith’s Legal Bulwark for Personal Freedom,” BYU 
Studies Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2013), 4–97. I discuss Judge Thomas Reynolds’ dismissal 
of the underlying indictments in my following article, “Missourian Efforts to 
Extradite Joseph Smith and the Ethics of Governor Thomas Reynolds of Missouri,” 
Interpreter: A Journal of Mormon Scripture (forthcoming).
 3. Ford, History of Illinois, 265.
 4. “Thomas Ford,” Governors of Illinois, Online Biographies (website), accessed 
February 8, 2018, http://www.onlinebiographies.info/gov/il/ford-t.htm.
 5. Letter from Governor Ford to Joseph Smith, June 22, 1844, History of the 
Church 6:533–537, accessed April 23, 2016, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/
ftrials/carthage/fordletter.html. Note that Governor Ford sets out some of his 
objections to the Nauvoo Charter and the Nauvoo Municipal Court’s exercise of 
its habeas corpus powers in this letter. However, note also that Governor Ford had 
earlier received Joseph Smith favorably and cooperated with him and his counsel, 
Justin Butterfield, in connection with the dismissal of his predecessor’s warrants to 
arrest Joseph in connection with the attempted murder of former Governor Boggs 
in Missouri.
 6. Richard Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, A Cultural History of Mormonism’s 
Founder (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 533; quoting from January 10, 17, and 
February 7 editions of the Warsaw Message in 1844, and from Charles A. Foster’s 
letter to the Editor of the same newspaper renamed the Warsaw Signal on April 12, 
1844.
 7. Ibid.
 8. Ibid., 427.
 9. Ibid.
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as Mayor of Nauvoo and his concern about “the political power of the 
growing number of Mormons in Hancock County.”10 That political power 
was demonstrated in Sharp’s loss in the 1842 Hancock County election 
for the Illinois legislature to William Smith, the Mormon Apostle and 
brother of the Prophet.11
Joseph Smith became something of an expert in the law12 as a result 
of the many legal cases in which he was involved.13 The purpose of this 
article is to show that neither he nor the other Latter-day Saints misused 
the English writ of habeas corpus in connection with Missouri’s efforts 
to extradite him to face criminal charges in that state. Indeed, the habeas 
corpus power in the Nauvoo Charter and the use that was made of it was 
reasonable, predictable, and legal according to the standards of the times.
I have approached this task in four parts. First, I summarize the 
nature of the habeas corpus powers provided to Nauvoo by its charter, and 
I concur with the assessment of James L. Kimball and Jeffrey N. Walker 
that despite what Governor Ford wrote in 1854, there was nothing 
particularly unusual about those powers when they were granted in 1840.
Second, to correct misunderstanding as to how habeas corpus worked 
in Illinois in the 1840s, I trace the history of the habeas corpus writ from 
England into the Western United States during the period before the 
Civil War, and I reject the notion that this writ predated Magna Carta 
and was always an instrument designed to protect the rights of prisoners. 
I provide this review so that readers will understand what happened in 
Joseph Smith’s habeas corpus cases in light of the law and practices that 
 10. Marshall Hamilton, “Thomas Sharp’s Turning Point: Birth of 
an Anti-Mormon,” Sunstone Magazine, October 1989, 21, https://www.
sunstonemagazine.com/pdf/073-16-23.pdf.
 11. James B. Allen and Glen E. Leonard, The Story of the Latter-day Saints. (Salt 
Lake City, UT: Deseret Book, 1976), 177.
 12. Perhaps referring to his ironic legal experience, Joseph Smith once observed:
I am a lawyer; I am a big lawyer and comprehend heaven, earth and hell, 
to bring forth knowledge that shall cover up all lawyers, doctors and other 
big bodies. This is the doctrine of the Constitution, so help me God. The 
Constitution is not law to us, but it makes provision for us whereby we 
can make laws. Where it provides that no one shall be hindered from 
worshiping God according to his own conscience, is a law. No legislature 
can enact a law to prohibit it. The Constitution provides to regulate bodies 
of men and not individuals. (History of the Church, 5:289–290).
 13. Joseph I. Bentley says that the Joseph Smith Papers Project team has counted 
“about 220 cases involving Joseph Smith as plaintiff, defendant, witness or judge” 
from 1819 when he was thirteen until his death in 1844” (“Road to Martyrdom, 
Joseph Smith’s Last Legal Cases,” BYU Studies Quarterly, 55, No. 2 (2016): 8–9).
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then applied, rather than in terms of practices after the Civil War, which 
have received more attention in American historical and legal literature. 
I believe this excursion is necessary to correct the misunderstanding 
that happens when historical practices are interpreted through the lens 
of modern understanding. During Joseph Smith’s time, habeas corpus 
processes were almost completely English, and United States courts at 
all levels had not yet resolved the question of whether municipal or state 
courts, granted habeas corpus powers by their charters and constitutions, 
could exercise those powers in federal cases.
In Part III, I further reject the idea — prominent in 19th-century 
American legal scholarship and which has found its way into the 
historiography of the Missouri extradition episodes — that it was 
American judges who pioneered review of the facts behind habeas corpus 
returns (written explanations of why jailers were holding their prisoners). 
I will explain that the Mormons did not abuse the habeas corpus process 
that had been developed by English judges and which was applied in a very 
English fashion in the United States before the Civil War.
In Part IV, I discuss the two causes of action cited for the Missouri 
requisitions for Joseph Smith’s arrest and extradition from Illinois to 
Missouri between 1840 and 1843. The first requisition, issued in 1840, was 
based upon Joseph Smith’s escape from Missouri while in transit to Boone 
County, where he was to be tried for arson, riot, burglary, treason, and 
receiving stolen goods during the Mormon War and extermination order 
period (what I will call the “first Mormon War requisition”).14 The affidavit 
supporting the second requisition for Joseph’s arrest by Missouri in August 
1842 alleged that he was an accessory before the fact in the attempted murder 
of Governor Lilburn W. Boggs on May 6, 1842, (the “accessory before the 
fact” requisition). The third requisition was a revival of the first cause of 
action and was peremptorily dismissed by the Nauvoo Municipal Court on 
double-jeopardy grounds (the “second Mormon War requisition”).
I argue that the first Mormon War requisition was a sham from start 
to finish since the indictments in the underlying cause of action had been 
dismissed before the extradition request was made, even though Joseph 
Smith and his team did not know that until late 1843. I also observe that 
if the first Mormon War requisition was invalid because the underlying 
cause of action had been dismissed, then as a necessary consequence, 
any warrant based upon those same charges was also invalid, even if 
a new indictment had been issued by a different court.
 14. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, 382.
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Since Judge Nathaniel Pope of the United States Circuit Court for the 
District of Illinois had found the accessory before the fact requisition invalid 
on January 5, 1843,15 I argue that the Nauvoo Municipal Court’s previous 
conduct in that matter was not unreasonable or oppressive. I also suggest 
reasons why Judge Pope’s ruling in Ex parte Smith16 was cited with approval 
as a precedent in the United States for more than 100 years afterwards.17
Even though Mormon critics argue that the Nauvoo Municipal Court 
exceeded its authority when dismissing the second Mormon War requisition, 
I argue that the process involved in the issue of that requisition was illegal 
and unethical in accordance with the principle of double jeopardy.
I conclude that criticism of the use of the writ of habeas corpus in 
Nauvoo between 1840 and 1843 on the basis that it was preferential, 
capricious, or overreaching is not substantiated by the law, the facts, or 
the practice of the period. Not all may agree that the actions taken by 
Nauvoo’s leaders during the Nauvoo Expositor episode were wise, but this 
analysis suggests that we in the 21st century should pause before passing 
judgment on 19th-century English legal practices in the US without 
proper understanding. (This analysis is also relevant to the use of the 
writ of habeas corpus during the Nauvoo Expositor episode, although 
that is not the focus of this article.)
Part I — City Habeas Corpus Powers in Illinois 
between 1837 and 1840
In 1971, James L. Kimball, Jr. was the first to publish a research article 
confirming that Nauvoo was not the only chartered Illinois city with 
a municipal court that had been granted habeas corpus powers by 1840.18 
Chicago was chartered first in March of 1837, Alton four months later 
in July 1837, Galena in 1839, and Springfield, the state capital along with 
Quincy, in 1840. Nauvoo was the sixth Illinois city to receive a charter 
and received it from the 12th Illinois legislature on December 16, 1840,19 
 15. Ibid., 479.
 16. Ex parte Smith, 22 F. Cas. 373 (C.C.D., Ill., 1843) (No. 12, 968); 3, McLean, 
121.
 17. Jeffrey N. Walker, “Invoking Habeas Corpus in Missouri and Illinois” quoted 
in Gordon A. Madsen, Jeffrey N. Walker and John W. Welch, eds., Sustaining the 
Law, Joseph Smith’s Legal Encounters (Provo UT: BYU Studies, 2014), 393.
 18. James L. Kimball, Jr., “The Nauvoo Charter: A Reinterpretation,” Journal 
of the Illinois State Historical Society, University of Illinois Press 64, no. 1 (Spring 
1971): 67–68. This article developed ideas that Kimball had researched in his 
Masters thesis at the University of Iowa in 1966.
 19. Ibid., 70. The Nauvoo Charter was effective from February 1, 1841.
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effective February 1, 1841. Though each city charter was different, 
Nauvoo’s 28-section charter closely followed the others.20 Kimball has 
noted differences,21 the largest in his view being Nauvoo’s omission of 
a residence or American citizenship requirement for public office. Kimball 
speculated that was because of Nauvoo’s wish to press recent Canadian 
and English converts into municipal service as soon as possible.22
While the original charters of Chicago and Alton did not specifically 
endow their municipal courts with habeas corpus powers,23 habeas 
corpus writs were popular, and Alton’s charter was amended in 1839 
to include a habeas corpus power24 before Nauvoo’s charter was even 
drafted. Effective June 3, 1839, the habeas corpus power amendment to 
Alton’s charter read as follows:
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in 
the General Assembly, That the judge of the municipal court of 
the city of Alton shall have power, and is hereby authorized, to 
issue writs of habeas corpus, writs ne exeat, writs of injunction, 
and writs certiorari, within the jurisdiction of said court; and 
the same proceedings shall be had thereon before said judge 
 20. Ibid., 68–70.
 21. Ibid., 70–74. Kimball’s list of differences includes:
i.) the absence of a residency requirement for city leaders,
ii.) the city council’s right to remove city offices “at will,”
iii.) the large number of alderman and councilors who, with the Mayor, 
formed the Council,
iv.) the fact that the principal judge of Nauvoo was also ex officio the 
Mayor, who thus conducted city business as Chief Judge with the aldermen 
functioning as Associate Justices.
However, the requirement that appeals from the Nauvoo Court would be heard in 
the Hancock County Circuit Court was more restrictive than equivalent provisions 
in the Chicago and Alton charters that granted their local courts “concurrent 
jurisdiction with the circuit courts of their respective counties” and thus allowed 
them to bypass the local circuit courts which could hear Nauvoo in jury trial cases.
 22. Ibid., 70.
 23. Encyclopedia of Chicago, s.v. “Act of Incorporation for the City of Chicago, 
1837,” http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/11480.html. The original 
powers of its municipal court are set out in clauses 69–78.
 24. https://papersofabrahamlincoln.org/documents/D271113b.
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and court as may be had in like cases before the circuit judges 
and circuit courts of this State, respectively.25
The right of Chicago’s municipal court to issue writs of habeas 
corpus is not so obvious. It was there from the beginning in 1837 in 
consequence of the language of section 69 which read:
That there shall be established in the said city of Chicago, 
a municipal court which shall have jurisdiction concurrent 
with the circuit courts of this State in all matters civil and 
criminal, arising within the limits of said city, and in all cases 
where either plaintiff and defendant or defendants, shall 
reside at the time of commencing suit, within said city, which 
court shall be held within the limits of said city in a building 
provided by the corporation.26
Jeffrey Walker calls this an express grant of habeas corpus power since 
Illinois’ circuit courts had the power to issue writs of habeas corpus.27
The habeas corpus power in Nauvoo’s charter documents, written 
18 months later, was expressed slightly differently but without tangible 
difference in legal consequence:
The Municipal Court shall have power to grant writs of 
habeas corpus in all cases arising under the ordinances of the 
City Council.28
 25. Ibid., Section 1 from “An Act to amend an act, entitled ‘An act to incorporate 
the city of Alton.’”
 26. Encyclopedia of Chicago, s.v. “Act of Incorporation for the City of Chicago, 
1837,” http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/11480.html, 19.
 27. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 33.
 28. This was a portion of section 17 of the Nauvoo charter. The whole read:
The Mayor shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases arising under the 
ordinances of the corporation, and shall issue such process as may be 
necessary to carry such ordinances into execution and effect; appeals may 
be had from any decision or judgment of said Mayor or Aldermen, arising 
under the city ordinances, to the Municipal Court under such regulations 
as may be presented by ordinance; which court shall be composed of the 
Mayor as Chief Justice, and the Aldermen as Associate Justices, and from 
the final judgment of the Municipal Court to the Circuit Court of Hancock 
county, in the same manner of appeals are taken from judgments of the 
Justices of the Peace; provided that the parties litigant shall have a right 
to a trial by a jury of twelve men in all cases before the Municipal Court. 
The Municipal Court shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in 
all cases arising under the ordinances of the City Council.
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Kimball observed that the charters of Chicago, Alton, Quincy, 
Galena, Springfield, and Nauvoo all “illustrate early nineteenth 
century tendencies towards democratization in government.”29 In 
other commentaries, that localization trend is attributed to Jefferson’s 
government30 and has much in common with the 21st century European 
concept of subsidiarity.31 While Kimball does not elaborate on the trend 
to encourage local government and judiciary, he concludes his discussion 
of the habeas corpus power possessed by the Nauvoo Municipal Court 
with the view that those provisions followed state precedent and “the 
powers of the court were well hedged and easily within the era’s allowable 
range of acceptance.”32 Walker’s summary is similar:
The drafting of the Nauvoo Charter was undoubtedly influenced 
by the Mormons’ experiences in Missouri and the perceived 
threat of additional efforts by the Missourians to apprehend 
Mormon leaders, especially Joseph Smith. Yet its grant of rights 
to issue writs of habeas corpus cannot be seen as entirely unique.33
The original habeas corpus powers in the Nauvoo charter documents 
were not tailored to respond to Missouri efforts to extradite Joseph Smith, 
since those efforts did not begin until September 1841. However, the 
Nauvoo City Council did later amend its ordinances to respond to the 
See https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nauvoo_Charter.
 29. Kimball, “The Nauvoo Charter: A Reinterpretation,” 70.
 30. For example, L.K. Caldwell, “Thomas Jefferson and Public Administration,” 
Public Administration Review 3, no. 3 (Summer, 1943): 240–53, where the author 
explains that Jefferson’s idea that administration should be delegated to the local 
level unless locals could not perform the relevant tasks was the tonic that undid 
the centralization that Alexander Hamilton drove through during Washington’s 
administration. Bushman has also observed that “[t]he charter implemented the 
Jeffersonian principle of distributing power to the level of society closest to the 
people” (Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, 412).
 31. The ideas of subsidiarity and sphere-sovereignty from Catholic and Calvinist 
social teaching from the late nineteenth century have roots in Aristotle and Aquinas 
and were also prominent in De Toqueville’s Democracy in America published in 
1835. For more detail on contemporary applications of these ideas, see Michelle 
Evans and Augusto Zimmerman, eds., Perspectives on Subsidiarity, (Dordrecht, 
2014). In its essence, the idea behind subsidiarity is that best government occurs 
when decision making authority is delegated to the level where the governmental 
decisions take effect.
 32. Kimball, “The Nauvoo Charter: A Reinterpretation,” 75.
 33. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 33.
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Missouri requisitions.34 Richard Bushman has suggested that the original 
Missouri requisition for Joseph Smith’s arrest on Mormon War charges 
was a response to Mormon redress petitions in the nation’s capital. Those 
petitions had embarrassed Missouri because they argued that the absence 
of any extradition proceedings to that point was a tacit admission of 
Missouri’s culpability in the Mormon War and extermination order.35
Missouri’s embarrassment and desire to arrest and incarcerate 
the citizen of another state did not invalidate the habeas corpus right. 
Citizen protection in the face of official displeasure was the very essence 
of that right — protection from what Joseph Smith had described as 
unrighteous dominion after his earlier and more famous incarceration 
without trial for nearly six months in jails at Richmond and Liberty, 
Missouri. Habeas corpus had been developed by English judges and 
parliamentarians to protect its citizens from the capricious and arbitrary 
conduct of an angry monarch, and its adoption into United States state 
charters was intended to do the same.
Part II — The History of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The Latin phrase habeas corpus literally means that a court required the 
body of the person charged in court so that it could make a decision in 
light of the facts. From as early as the end of the 13th century, English 
courts would issue orders using this phrase to make sure parties were in 
court so civil cases could proceed. But the “modern” use of the writ by 
courts to review arrests by members of the executive English government 
can only be traced to the 16th and 17th centuries.36
Walker observes that a complete history of the idea of habeas corpus 
would review “a series of writs from the Middle Ages” before Magna Carta 
in 1215, which provided protection from imprisonment.37 While Magna 
Carta does foreshadow the writ of habeas corpus, since clauses 38 to 40 of 
 34. Nauvoo Neighbor 1, No. 33 (13 December 1843): 1, which was described as “an 
extra Ordinance for the extra case of Joseph Smith and Others.” This amendment 
was passed five days earlier on 8 December 1843. This amendment, and the Missouri 
action that prompted it, is discussed in the author’s sequel article, “Missourian 
Efforts to Extradite Joseph Smith and the Ethics of Governor Thomas Reynolds of 
Missouri,” Interpreter: A Journal of Mormon Scripture 28 (forthcoming).
 35. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, 397, 405, 505.
 36. R.J. Sharp, The Law of Habeas Corpus, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Clarendon 
Press, 1989), 1–3.
 37. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 8.
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the original version denied arbitrary imprisonment without prompt trial,38 
the writ of habeas corpus extolled as the engine of practical liberty was a 
much later judicial innovation.39 The English legal historian Edward Jenks 
observed that when it first appeared, the king’s high writ of habeas corpus 
was about getting people into prison rather than getting them out.40 The 
counter-intuitive origin of the writ of habeas corpus in English history 
will not surprise readers familiar with English legal history; they know 
the impartial English jury was actually a tool of the king, who summoned 
people who were likely well-informed about their neighborhoods. There 
was originally no trace of an impartiality requirement in their selection. 
The first jurors were chosen because they likely knew, or would be able to 
discover, the detail and value of property in their towns and the identity of 
people likely to have committed notorious crimes.
The Canadian scholar Robert Sharp has confirmed that by the 16th 
century the writ of habeas corpus was being used to combat executive 
committals. The writ was not originally connected with liberty but 
involved an element of due process because the courts were unwilling to 
decide anything in connection with a case without the physical presence 
of the defendant in court.41 However, the medieval rule held that the 
king’s writs were not available when imprisonment was by the king’s 
order.42 The original writs were part of the marketing of the king’s justice 
 38. William S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 3rd ed., (London: Methuen 
& Co, 1945), 2: 215. Note that the original 1215 version of Magna Carta was revoked 
by the Pope within three months of its finalization in June 1215. The numbering of 
these clauses is changed in the later 1217, 1225 and 1297 issues of the Great Charter 
where slightly abbreviated versions of the clauses that conceptually prefigure the 
writ of habeas corpus are numbered 28 and 29.
 39. For example, in his judgment in favor of Joseph Smith in Ex parte Smith 22 
F. Cas. 373 (C.C.D. Ill 1843) (No, 12,968), Judge Nathaniel Pope wrote:
All who are familiar with English history, must know that it was extorted 
from an arbitrary monarch, that it was hailed as a second magna carta, 
and that it was to protect the subject from arbitrary imprisonment by the 
king and his minions, which brought into existence that great palladium 
of liberty in the latter part of the reign of Charles II. It was indeed a 
magnificent achievement over arbitrary power. Magna Carta established 
the principles of liberty; the habeas corpus protected them. (377)
 40. Edward Jenks, “The Story of Habeas Corpus,” Law Quarterly Review XVIII, 
(1902) reprinted in Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, (New York: The 
Lawbook Exchange, 1992): 532.
 41. Sharp, The Law of Habeas Corpus, 1–3.
 42. Ibid., 4.
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as a desirable alternative to local and franchise courts.43 The adaptation 
of the writs to achieve other purposes, including prompt peer trials, was 
a trial and error effort that took centuries to unfold. It was not really 
secure until the 17th century when Parliament had acquired the power to 
force the king to accept the Petition of Right in 1628 and the first Habeas 
Corpus Act following the Restoration of the monarchy in 1679.
Jenks has explained that the innovation which developed the habeas 
corpus writ as an instrument of liberty came when the writ was paired 
with the idea of privilege.44 That is, if a writ of habeas corpus could 
remove a trial from a local court into the king’s court, then a person 
of high breeding could similarly insist that his case should always be 
heard in a higher court. This idea also resonated with the Magna Carta’s 
idea that barons were entitled to a trial by their peers.45 Its potential 
was amplified in the early 17th century when Sir Edward Coke asserted 
that his common-law courts had authority to hear cases traditionally 
heard in other courts, including the king’s ecclesiastical courts.46 These 
ideas appealed in colonial America, and they appealed to Joseph Smith 
from the pages of William Blackstone’s famous 18th-century English law 
commentaries because a corrupt court could be called to account by 
another court with completely different jurisdiction.47
The judicial innovation that saw the writ of habeas corpus used to 
test arrests by lesser members of the King’s Executive took much longer 
to settle. The efforts of the king’s common-law judges to use the writ 
of habeas corpus to protect high-born folk against orders made by the 
king’s equity (Chancery and Exchequer Chamber) and prerogative 
(Star Chamber and High Commission) courts, resulted in furious 
 43. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 5:300. See also Sharp, The Law of 
Habeas Corpus, 4. As a matter of practice, no one ever queried the king’s orders one 
on one. They were only successfully (and safely) challenged by collectives as when 
the barons challenged King John in connection with Magna Carta in 1215 and 
when Parliament secured the Petition of Right from King Charles I in 1627.
 44. Jenks, “The Story of Habeas Corpus,” 538–40.
 45. Note that the trial by peers envisaged in Magna Carta did not extend to all 
classes and was not a jury trial. The trial of peers in the House of Lords was not 
abolished until 1948 (The Criminal Justice Act (UK)). During the 12th century, juries 
discovered facts for the king on the basis of personal knowledge. Jury impartiality 
was not well established until the 15th century (Theodore Plucknett, A Concise 
History of the Common Law (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1956), 129–30).
 46. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 243–44.
 47. Bentley, “Road to Martyrdom, Joseph Smith’s Last Legal Cases,” 36, 54–55. 
Bentley notes that Joseph Smith and the Nauvoo Municipal Council often referred 
to Blackstone as their bible of the law absent modern in-house counsel.
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jurisdictional battles.48 But in an age when judges were still appointed 
and dismissed at the pleasure of the king, a return that cited the king’s 
personal authority behind an imprisonment engaged a wholly different 
level of political consideration. Would a judge risk his career and possibly 
his life by ordering the release of a man if he were convinced the king 
had indeed ordered the imprisonment challenged by a particular writ of 
habeas corpus?49 If a lesser departmental official of the king was behind 
the arrest, the personal safety of the judge was not so large an issue.
Darnell’s case in England in 162750 focused on the practical question 
of whether a judge would countermand the king’s personal order of 
imprisonment; the resulting judicial back-down was redressed by the 
House of Commons the following year when Sir Edward Coke authored 
the Petition of Right. Because King Charles I needed funding for his 
military campaign in France,51 the House of Commons required him 
to concede that his judges could issue the writ of habeas corpus in cases 
where the imprisonment had been the result of Executive direction, 
including his own personal direction.
The story of habeas corpus in England after Darnell’s case in 1627 and 
the Petition of Right, which immediately followed, tells of English judges 
looking behind the returns provided by jailers when responding to habeas 
 48. Sharp, The Law of Habeas Corpus, 6–8. Note that while English habeas 
corpus history did not feature jurisdictional battles between state and federal 
jurisdictions, the battles between the common-law courts, the ecclesiastical 
courts, and the king’s prerogative courts were much more furious, largely because 
twentieth-century ideas of jurisdiction did not yet exist.
 49. Ibid., 10. Sharp suggests that the practical questions revolved around when 
the court had to accept on good faith a statement in the jailer’s return that the king 
had ordered the imprisonment and whether the king’s executive power so exercised 
superseded the common-law adjudicatory process.
 50. In this case, which is also known as the Five Knights’ case (3 How. St. Tr. 
1 (K.B. 1627)), the warrant that resulted in the imprisonment had been personally 
signed by two members of the king’s privy council. Though the court of King’s 
Bench had issued the writ of habeas corpus, when the return was duly provided 
confirming direct Privy Council engagement on the king’s behalf, the judges 
backed down, retreating to the old rule which had held since medieval times that 
the king’s executive orders were an exception to the general habeas corpus rules 
that applied in other cases.
 51. For example, Gregorio F. Zaide, World History (Quezon City, Philippines: 
Rex Printing Company Inc., 2000 reprint), 221–22. Zaide reports that Parliament’s 
price in supporting the king’s request for additional fundraising was the Petition of 
Right, which was prepared by the Commons and supported by the Lords.
Thompson, The Habeas Corpus Protection of Joseph Smith  •  285
corpus writs.52 When jailers sought to deny judicial review by claiming the 
prisoner was held by personal order of the king, judges refused to accept 
those simple assertions, and if proper reasons were not given on the face of 
the record or by testimony, the prisoners were released.
Robert Sharp says that although the king flouted his promise to 
give reasons for all imprisonments after the Petition of Right (1628) as 
soon as his urgent need for finance had passed, the practice of providing 
reasons gradually took hold.53 And in a short time, that practice was 
reinforced by the first English Habeas Corpus Act in 1640, and others 
soon followed. The 1679 Habeas Corpus Act (UK) was passed to curtail 
a variety of Executive abuses that developed to get around the writ. These 
included the arrest of prisoners when the courts were not in session 
and the removal of prisoners to places like Scotland and the Channel 
Islands, where the writ did not reach.54 Certainly, errors on the face of 
the record enabled court interference in cases of Executive arrest,55 but 
section 3 of the 1816 Habeas Corpus Act (UK) confirmed again that the 
courts were authorized to examine the truth of the reasons given in cases 
where liberty was infringed by an act of the Executive.56 If not so, state 
officials and inferior tribunals would have been free to determine the 
 52. When a writ of habeas corpus was issued by a competent court, it was issued 
to the person “holding the body” of the person in custody, who was simply the 
jailer. It directed the jailer to bring the person concerned to the court making the 
order and go explain why the person was being so held. Since jailers were often 
not familiar with the procedural niceties of the laws under which an arrest had 
been made, when questioned as to the reason they were holding someone, they 
would answer simply, saying “by order of the king” or similar. In time, as writs of 
habeas corpus became more common, they would read a script. But these simple 
recitations would not always satisfy the ordering judge, who would order the release 
of prisoners if adequate and just cause could not be shown.
 53. Sharp, The Law of Habeas Corpus, 15.
 54. See Amanda L. Tyler’s extensive discussion of the influence of the 1679 
Habeas Corpus Act (UK) on the embodiment of the privilege and the suspension 
practice that was both endorsed and limited in the US Constitution. (“A ‘Second 
Magna Carta’: The English Habeas Corpus Act and the Statutory Origins of the 
Habeas Privilege,” Notre Dame Law Review 19 (2016): 1949.) See also Geoffrey 
Robertson, The Tyrannicide Brief (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), 349. Robertson 
observed that the US Supreme Court relied on the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act (UK) 
to invalidate similar executive overreach by the US government when it established 
the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, partly for the reason that prisoners held 
there would be beyond the reach of US habeas corpus.
 55. Sharp, The Law of Habeas Corpus, 25.
 56. Ibid., 71.
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limits of their own powers when it came to imprisonment,57 and the laws 
requiring all matters affecting the liberty of the subject to be construed 
strictly would be without effect.58
For English judges, the core of the writ of habeas corpus was to 
review the sufficiency of the evidence, especially if that was not clear 
from the face of the return.59 English habeas corpus principle and 
practice was well known, respected, and followed by US judges at the 
time of Joseph Smith’s habeas corpus experiences. Subsequent American 
commentators have stated that American innovation first saw the courts 
examine the sufficiency of evidence rather than take arrest warrants at 
face value60 but that American reinterpretation completely ignores how 
the English developed the writ as a check on Executive power. It also 
ignores how the English Parliament bargained with the king — before 
American independence — to make sure English judges were authorized 
by habeas corpus Acts to look beyond simple summaries of the reasons 
for imprisonment that jailers gave in response to habeas corpus writs.
During Joseph Smith’s lifetime, habeas corpus practice in America 
remained decidedly English. The supremacy of federal courts lay 
in the future, but some of the seeds of that future were planted by 
Justin  Butterfield, who served as the United States District Attorney 
for Illinois and represented Joseph Smith before federal circuit judge 
Nathaniel Pope. Joseph Smith’s first Illinois habeas corpus hearing 
before Judge Stephen A. Douglas in the Illinois Supreme Court (state) in 
response to the first Missouri Mormon War requisition61 did not result 
in any jurisdictional argument. Butterfield advised that the charge that 
Joseph Smith had been an accessory before-the-fact in the attempted 
murder of the former governor of a state should be brought in the Illinois 
 57. Ibid., 73.
 58. Ibid., 55.
 59. Ibid., 79.
 60. For example, Jeffrey Walker says that habeas corpus was primarily used 
as “a vehicle to protect from misuse of the judicial processes or procedures,” and 
that it was the American courts that “began ‘looking behind the writ’ to review 
the underlying charges” (Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century 
Mormonism,” 15).
 61. See, for example, Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century 
Mormonism,” 53–56. The hearing of the second warrant case in Judge Nathaniel 
Pope’s federal circuit court also avoided the possibility that the relevant Illinois 
Supreme Court judge might be sympathetic to an extradition request from 
Governor Thomas Reynolds of Missouri, who had previously served as Chief 
Justice of the State of Illinois.
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Circuit Court (federal). Bringing that second Illinois habeas corpus 
case in federal court was innovative and was strenuously opposed by 
Josiah  Lamborn, arguing for the State of Illinois.62 But Lamborn’s 
challenge did not sway the presiding federal judge, Nathaniel Pope, and 
his decision in favor of Joseph Smith was cited as a precedent for more 
than 100 years afterwards.63
Part III — How US Habeas Corpus Practice Was Innovative
However, to give a fair overview of this practice in United States history and 
so readers interested in LDS history may properly understand Joseph Smith’s 
legitimate and “English” use of the writ of habeas corpus, I will briefly 
explain what was and remains innovative in US habeas corpus practice.
The English Courts never developed a post-conviction habeas corpus 
practice because they did not have to deal with imaginative efforts to 
confirm the liberty of former slaves.64 That was partly because of the 
success of the anti-slavery politics of William Wilberforce, partly because 
England did not have a federal constitution entrenching a federal version 
of habeas corpus, and partly because English jurisprudence has always 
had an aversion to any interference with the finality of the trial process.65 
Robert Sharp says the essential reason the United States developed the 
writ of habeas corpus as a post-trial remedy was because of the belief 
that any claim that a criminal trial breached constitutional law was best 
 62. On the first day of the hearing (Wednesday, January 4, 1843), Josiah Lamborn 
as Attorney-General for the State of Illinois, argued that the federal court had no 
jurisdiction to hear the matter, but Judge Pope accepted the contrary argument 
for Joseph Smith that the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction “because Joseph 
Smith was in custody ‘under color of US Law.’” (Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early 
Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 60–61).
 63. Walker says that “the first official ‘legal’ version of the report was published 
in 1847 in Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Circuit Court of the 
United States for the Seventh Circuit (Cincinnati, OH: Derby, Bradley and Co., 
1847) as 3  McLean 121 and includes a synopsis of the case, selected pleadings 
(Bogg’s affidavit, Reynold’s request for extradition, and Ford’s arrest warrant), and 
the opinion from the court.” He continues that “the preferred official version was 
published in 1896 as 22 F. Cas. 373 in The Federal Cases Comprising Cases Argued 
and Determined in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States” (“Habeas 
Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 68n210).
 64. During the same period that the United States was being reconstructed 
physically and legally after the Civil War, the English Parliament simplified its own 
formal appeals process to deal with unsafe convictions in the Judicature Acts of 
1873 and 1875 (respectively 36 & 37 Vic. c 66 and 38 & 39 Vic. c 77).
 65. Sharp, The Law of Habeas Corpus, 146.
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heard by a forum divorced from the guilt-finding process.66 But that is 
also a simplification of a process developed over an extended period.
In a 1965 article in The University of Chicago Law Review, 
Dallin H. Oaks wrote that most of the states followed the English Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1679 when they sought to provide the habeas corpus 
guarantee in their state constitutions. However, that state legislation 
was passed only after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, 
in consequence of the English Crown’s previous position that the writ 
of habeas corpus was not available in the colonies.67 While most of the 
state statutes that implemented habeas corpus were “patterned after the 
English act,”68 there were variations. Generally, the benefits of the writ 
did not “extend to persons properly charged with felony or treason or to 
‘persons convict’ or in execution under civil or criminal process.”69 But 
there was variation as to whether the writ was available only in criminal 
matters or whether it extended to the restraint of liberty for any cause, 
including civil matters.70 There was also variation as to whether writs of 
habeas corpus could be issued when the courts were not in session, and 
some jurisdictions extended the English template to authorize judges not 
just to allow bail when they perceived a defect in process or evidence but 
to release such prisoners completely.71
In effect, when passing their state constitutions, the American states 
added to the remedial work done by the English Habeas Corpus Act 
of 1679 and codified the English common-law practice that developed 
during the century after that Act was passed. Before 1865, there is no 
evidence that the US courts were using the writ of habeas corpus to review 
convictions unless it could be shown that the impugned proceedings 
were somehow void ab initio.72
Habeas corpus petitions brought after conviction fell under 
the shadow of state legislation patterned after [the English Act 
 66. Ibid.
 67. Dallin H. Oaks, “Habeas Corpus in the States 1776–1865,” The University of 
Chicago Law Review 32, no. 2 (Winter 1965): 251. See also Tyler, “A ‘Second Magna 
Carta’: The English Habeas Corpus Act and the Statutory Origins of the Habeas 
Privilege,” 1985–87.
 68. Oaks, “Habeas Corpus in the States 1776–1865,” 254.
 69. Ibid.
 70. Ibid.
 71. Ibid.
 72. Ibid., 262–63. That is, void from the beginning of the relevant process.
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of 1679 and still] … withheld the benefits … from ‘persons 
convict or in execution by legal process’.73
Thus, Oaks confirmed that once states had claimed the writ of 
habeas corpus for themselves, the only pre-Civil War innovations 
to the law related to adjusting the categories where the English 
writ was applicable. The emergence of the writ of habeas corpus as 
a  post-conviction remedy lay in the future. But slavery cases before 
the Civil War hinted at the development of the writ of habeas corpus 
that was to come, and Justin  Butterfield made reference to the use of 
habeas corpus writs in northern slave cases before the Civil War when he 
defended Joseph Smith against the accessory before the fact requisition 
in federal court. Josiah Lamborn for Illinois, on behalf of Missouri, had 
argued that the case should have been brought in the Illinois Supreme 
Court because the matter was between two states and did not involve 
the federal government. Butterfield replied that the federal court had 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear Smith’s case. It had been held, in a case 
seeking the return of a Louisiana slave in the New York Court of Errors, 
that “the state process could not circumvent federal process” or the US 
Constitution. After that, he asked rhetorically, “Has not my client, Joseph 
Smith, the rights of a [slave]?”74
Slavery Cases before the Civil War
Before the Civil War, Oaks reports, the way habeas corpus issues were 
decided in slavery cases had more to do with geography than doctrine.75 
In the North, when a writ of habeas corpus for a slave was returned to 
the court, a hearing was held to determine whether or not he was a slave, 
and if proven to be so, the court would remand him to his master’s 
custody. If he was proven to be a free man, he was released. In the South, 
however, the writ of habeas corpus was not available for a colored person 
because the master was entitled to a jury trial before being deprived of 
his property. Some southern courts held that there was no point to the 
use of the writ in slavery cases since a master could claim the slave again. 
But Oaks claims that reasoning is suspect since English law ruled against 
 73. Ibid., 261. Oaks reports that there were few such applications before 1850 
but many afterwards but he could not find any “explanation” for that increase.
 74. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 
62–64.
 75. Oaks, “Habeas Corpus in the States 1776–1865,” 267.
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those recapturing a person who had been discharged following a hearing 
on a writ of habeas corpus.76
Before the Civil War, two writs were available to determine slave 
cases. Bail-like arrangements were normally made until trial when 
the issues would be heard by a jury rather than by a judge, as was the 
invariable practice in habeas corpus cases. Juries allowed community 
sentiment a place in the process, but the process also allowed slaves 
to escape on terms of bond forfeiture — a price that some abolitionist 
plaintiffs were prepared to pay.77 But the choice as to which writ was 
most likely to secure a party’s objectives in slavery cases before the Civil 
War differed from state to state and from North to South.
Slavery Cases after the Civil War
After the Civil War, US Habeas Corpus Act 1867 tipped the federal-state 
balance in favor of the federal government.78 Congress passed the 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 at the same time that it implemented the 
Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment. Before 
the Civil War, state courts in abolitionist states had resisted slavery by 
requiring detailed evidence of title to slaves before they would release 
runaway slaves to slaveholders and federal marshals in accordance 
with the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. After the Civil War, it was 
the federal courts that were skeptical about black arrests because they 
appeared to be enforcing slavery.79
Though congressional understanding of the legal history and 
development behind the Habeas Corpus Bill in 1866 was limited, the 
new Bill was drafted to enlarge and strengthen federal court power. 80 
The final language of the Habeas Corpus Act confirmed that federal 
courts could hear writs of habeas corpus filed by prisoners held under 
state law. It also permitted the federal courts to do their own fact-finding 
about those cases and allowed appeals to the Supreme Court.81
The spirit of federal court cooperation with federal government 
policy is manifest in the decision in In re Turner (1867), given shortly after 
 76. Ibid., 268, 277.
 77. Ibid., 281–82.
 78. William M. Wiecek, “The Great Writ and Reconstruction: The Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1867,” The Journal of Southern History 36, no. 4 (Nov. 1970): 548.
 79. Mark M. Arkin, “The Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery, Federalism and Habeas 
Corpus for State Prisoners,” Tulane Law Review 70, no. 1 (Nov 1995): 4–5.
 80. Wiecek, “The Great Writ and Reconstruction,” 538–39.
 81. Ibid., 539.
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the Bill was passed into law.82 The case was decided by Salmon P. Chase, 
the sixth Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court acting in his capacity as 
a Circuit Court Judge. He had previously served as Abraham Lincoln’s 
Treasury Secretary. Justice Chase ordered the release of an ex-slave who 
was bound to her former master under the Maryland Apprenticeship 
Act.83 He struck down the Maryland law because it attempted to 
impose involuntary servitude contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment.84 
Other federal courts took similar action to disallow southern judicial 
enforcement of the Black Codes.85
The 1867 Habeas Corpus Act empowered US federal courts to issue 
writs of habeas corpus “in all cases where any person may be restrained 
of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or any treaty or 
law of the United States.”86 But its innovation was the authorization of 
federal court review of cases already decided in state courts. The political 
justification for this intrusion into state rights and sovereignty was the 
supremacy of federal law as confirmed by the outcome of the Civil War, 
but the underlying argument about the bounds of state rights has never 
been authoritatively resolved.87 However this history is interpreted, the 
federal judiciary’s insistence that state courts could not decide federal 
constitutional issues was well entrenched by 1880.88
Habeas Corpus in Joseph Smith’s 
Federal Case before the Civil War
On the first day of Joseph Smith’s habeas corpus hearing in federal court 
before Judge Nathaniel Pope, Josiah Lamborn (for Illinois and Missouri) 
and Justin Butterfield (for Joseph Smith) argued about jurisdiction. 
 82. Ibid., 541.
 83. Ibid.
 84. Ibid. See also Charles Olmsted, “In re Turner (1867)” (paper, Legan History 
Publications, 2005), 1. http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1002&context=mlh_pubs.
 85. Ibid. The Black Codes were laws passed by the Southern States after the Civil 
War to restrict the freedom of former slaves by requiring them to work for low 
wages and sometimes, to clear artificially created debt.
 86. An Act to amend “An Act to establish the judicial Courts of the United States,” 
approved September twenty-fourth, seventeen hundred and eighty-nine,” Session II, 
Chapter 28, 14 Statute 385 (1867). See also https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-
at-large/40th-congress/session-2/c40s2ch34.pdf.
 87. Wiecek, “The Great Writ and Reconstruction: The Habeas Corpus Act of 
1867,” 544.
 88. Ibid.
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Their jurisdictional argument would not have been necessary after 
the Civil War since the federal jurisdiction would have prevailed. But 
an assumption by many modern lawyers and historians of federal 
jurisdictional prevalence is not appropriate in Joseph Smith’s habeas 
corpus cases before the Civil War; it did not yet exist. Lamborn (for Illinois 
and Missouri) was justified in arguing at this time that the federal court 
had no jurisdiction in Smith’s case because it was a matter between two 
states. But Butterfield asserted that the federal courts had a legitimate 
claim to jurisdiction. Butterfield’s argument was easily upheld since the 
judge in this case was a federal judge. While the legal argument was 
unsettled in 1843, the recommendations of Butterfield, Judge Douglas, 
and Governor Ford that this case should be brought in the federal court 
show the new federal jurisdiction beginning to unfold.89
For the purposes of this article, the important point is that US 
habeas corpus practice largely followed English practice until the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1867 was passed following the Civil War. That legislation 
was a part of the Reconstruction package, which included the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. It authorized federal 
courts to review state judicial practices that enabled slavery under 
another name. Though habeas corpus writs were used in slavery cases 
before the Civil War, practices varied from North to South depending on 
whether the relevant court was part of a state inclined to free slaves or to 
preserve them as a form of property.
This brief summary of that history shows how the writ of habeas corpus 
was changed in the United States after the Civil War. Those changes did not 
affect the habeas corpus doctrine or practice in Nauvoo, Illinois, during 
the early 1840s. But the early use of the writ of habeas corpus in some 
pre-Civil War slavery cases enabled Justin Butterfield, Joseph Smith’s lead 
advocate before the US Circuit Court in 1843, to rhetorically ask whether 
his client, Joseph Smith had at least the rights of a slave.90
Part IV — The Missouri Warrants for Joseph Smith’s 
Arrest between 1840 and 1843
In the unabridged version of his article entitled “Habeas Corpus in Early 
Nineteenth Century Mormonism,”91 Jeffrey Walker has confirmed that 
 89. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 
62–64.
 90. Ibid., 64.
 91. Ibid. Note that an abridged version of the unabridged article was reprinted 
in Walker, “Invoking Habeas Corpus in Missouri and Illinois.”
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the State of Missouri sought the extradition of Joseph Smith to stand 
trial in Missouri on multiple occasions but on only two grounds.
The first of those grounds was that Joseph Smith was a fugitive from 
Missouri justice and had never been tried on charges “ranging from 
arson, burglary and robbery to treason and even murder.”92 These were 
the charges that famously resulted in Joseph Smith’s imprisonment, first 
at Richmond, Missouri, and then, following transfer, at Liberty, near 
modern-day Kansas City.
The second Missouri warrant for Joseph Smith’s arrest asserted that 
he was an accessory before the fact in the attempted murder of former 
Governor Lilburn W. Boggs on May 6, 1842. This idea seems to have 
been spawned by anti-Mormons including John C. Bennett in Illinois.93
The Mormon War Charges
Walker is gentle when he discusses the Mormon War charges, especially 
in light of the information he has uncovered in connection with them. 
He has written:
In early April 1839, Joseph Smith, Hyrum Smith, 
Lyman  Wight, Alexander McRae, and Caleb Baldwin were 
taken from Liberty Jail … to Gallatin, Daviess County, where 
a grand jury was empanelled … to consider the charges … 
against them, including the … treason. There, after a two-
day hearing … Judge Thomas Burch granted a request to 
change venue to Boone County due to the fact that he had 
been the prosecuting attorney in the preliminary hearing 
before Judge Austin King. En route to Boone County, all of 
the prisoners either escaped or were released and made their 
way to Illinois to join the body of the Church.
Sixteen months later, on September 1, 1840, Governor Boggs 
sent a requisition to Illinois Governor Thomas Carlin seeking 
the extradition of Joseph Smith and five others to Missouri 
based on these outstanding indictments. The extradition 
request was supported by the indictments, of which Governor 
Boggs had secured certified copies in July 1839. What is not 
clear is whether Governor Boggs knew that in August 1839 all 
of these indictments had been dismissed based on a motion by 
the Boone County prosecuting attorney. The judge in Boone 
 92. Ibid., 23.
 93. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling , 468.
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County was Governor Boggs’s successor, Thomas Reynolds 
… The hearing started on a procedural matter, since the 
underlying indictments from the Missouri courts had not 
been attached to the arrest warrant as required by law. As this 
procedural irregularity could result in further postponement, 
both sides stipulated that such indictments existed. Ironically, 
had Joseph Smith’s counsel further investigated this issue, they 
would have discovered that in fact no indictments existed, all of 
them having been dismissed in August 1840 by the now sitting 
Missouri Governor Reynolds (emphasis added).94
I discuss the legal and ethical issues in the State of Missouri’s 
conduct that Walker has raised in his research in my second, shorter 
article about the Missouri requisitions for Joseph Smith’s arrest. The 
purpose of this article is to show that there was nothing improper or 
even unwise in Joseph Smith’s response to these requisitions. Given the 
malevolent attitudes that existed toward him in Missouri, the only other 
course Joseph Smith could have taken was to run away and hide, and that 
would have been interpreted by the world as well as Church members as 
an admission of guilt.
The first Mormon War requisition for Joseph Smith’s arrest was 
never dealt with by the Nauvoo Municipal Court. Rather, that warrant 
was handled by Illinois Supreme Court Justice Stephen A. Douglas in 
June 1841 in Monmouth, Illinois. Judge Douglas considered the merits 
of the requisition following the issue of an arrest warrant by Illinois 
Governor Thomas Carlin, after Joseph Smith was arrested at the Heberlin 
Hotel in Bear Creek 28 miles south of Nauvoo. The writ of habeas corpus 
that had permitted Joseph to return home until Judge Douglas could 
hear the merits of the case a few days later at Monmouth95 was issued 
by Charles Warren, an equity court official in Quincy. Bushman says 
Judge Douglas decided the case on a technicality that gave the Latter-day 
Saints the result they wanted but without vindicating them.96 Bushman 
has also suggested that the favorable judgment was part of Douglas’s 
“mission to recover [the LDS vote and the balance of power] for the 
Democrats” in future elections.97
Walker’s analysis of the legal issues is more nuanced. Judge Douglas 
heard witnesses from both sides and could have looked behind the writ, 
 94. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 34–37.
 95. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling , 425–26.
 96. Ibid., 426.
 97. Ibid.
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but he did not need to. The original warrant for Joseph’s arrest on the 
Mormon War charges had been issued in September 1840 by Illinois 
Governor Carlin following Missouri requisition, but the warrant was 
spent because it had been returned to Governor Carlin.98 Walker has 
explained that, despite the suggestion that Douglas made the decision 
in favor of the Prophet to garner Mormon political support,99 the 
ruling was legally correct, and it is misleading to suggest that the case 
was decided on a technicality. A returned warrant was functus officio, 
meaning it could not be reused or resurrected in any way. It was dead. 
There was a variety of sound judicial precedent for that decision,100 but 
Walker has observed that even if Judge Douglas had not been able to 
deal with the case on the basis that the warrant was spent, there was 
ample evidence before him that the warrant had been issued “by fraud, 
bribery and duress.”101 That evidence meant he would have been able to 
decide the case in favor of the liberty of Joseph Smith in accordance with 
established precedent, even if the warrant was not spent. It is also clear 
that if Judge Douglas had known the underlying indictments had been 
dismissed by then-Justice Reynolds in August 1840, he would have had 
a third reason to order Joseph set free.
The Accessory Before the Fact Charges
While he was reading the newspaper in his Missouri home at about 9pm on 
May 6, 1842, someone tried to kill Lilburn W. Boggs, the former governor 
of Missouri.102 Bushman says that early suspicion fell on Boggs’ political 
opponents “in a heated campaign for a state senate seat.”103 However, 
two weeks later, anti-Mormons in Illinois started reporting rumors of 
Joseph  Smith’s involvement — ranging from an alleged prophecy that 
Boggs would suffer a violent death within a year to John C. Bennett’s 
more direct allegations in letters to the Sangamo Journal. Bennett alleged 
therein that Joseph “had offered a five-hundred dollar reward for Boggs’ 
death” and that “Orrin Porter Rockwell [w]as the likely assassin.”104
 98. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 39.
 99. Ibid.
 100. Ibid., Walker cites decisions to the same effect by the New York Supreme 
Court in 1821 (Filkins v Brockway 19 Johns 170, 171) and the Maryland Court of 
Appeal in 1834 (Hall v Hall 6 G. & L. 386, 411).
 101. Ibid., 38.
 102. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, 468.
 103. Ibid.
 104. Ibid. See also Andrew H. Hedges and Alex D. Smith, “Joseph Smith, 
John  C.  Bennett, and the Extradition Attempt,” quoted in Joseph Smith, the 
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Bushman records that Rockwell was living in Independence, Missouri, 
near his in-laws at the time because he was awaiting the birth of his fourth 
child, but he says that Rockwell left Independence immediately after the 
shooting. Bennett then “traveled to Missouri to publicize his suspicions,” 
which were plausible because of Boggs’ history in mistreating the 
Mormons.105 Missouri Sheriff, J. H. Reynolds eventually arrested Rockwell 
for attempted murder and held him for a year, but Rockwell was defended 
by Alexander Doniphan and acquitted of all charges.106
In the meantime, and so as to protect Joseph Smith should an 
arrest warrant be issued premised on these allegations, the Nauvoo City 
Council utilized their habeas corpus power and passed an ordinance 
empowering them to examine all outside arrest warrants and issue writs 
of habeas corpus.107 The Council also asked Illinois State Governor Carlin 
to disregard the false reports of John Cook Bennett, but “[b] y August 
8, the extradition papers had passed from Governor Thomas Reynolds 
of Missouri through Carlin to the deputy sheriff of Adams County,” 
who then arrested both Orrin Porter Rockwell and Joseph  Smith in 
Prophet and Seer , Richard Neitzel Holzapfel and Kent P. Jackson, eds. (Provo, 
UT: Religious Studies Center, Brigham Young University; Salt Lake City: Deseret 
Book, 2010), 437–66, https://rsc.byu.edu/archived/joseph-smith-prophet-and-seer/
joseph-smith-john-c-bennett-and-extradition-attempt-1842. Bennett’s letter in the 
Sangamo Journal as follows:
In 1841, Joe Smith predicted or prophesied in a public congregation in 
Nauvoo, that Lilburn W Boggs, ex-Governor of Missouri, should die 
by violent hands within one year. From one or two months prior to the 
attempted assassination of Gov. Boggs, Mr. O. P. Rockwell left Nauvoo 
for parts unknown to the citizens at large. I was then on terms of close 
intimacy with Joe Smith, and asked him where Rockwell had gone? 
‘Gone,’ said he, ‘GONE TO FULFILL PROPHECY!
 105. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, 468.
 106. In fact, the Independence grand jury never indicted Rockwell for the 
attempted murder of Boggs, and the only trial that Rockwell faced was in respect 
to a failed escape attempt. (Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century 
Mormonism,” 47n129). See Robert Nelson, Enemy of the Saints: The Biography of 
Lilburn W. Boggs of Missouri, (Baltimore: Publish America, 2011). Nelson reports 
that Sheriff Reynold’s initial suspicion fell on a local hired man named Tomkins 
because of evidence provided by the shopkeeper whose stolen pepperbox pistol was 
found abandoned at the scene of the crime. But Reynolds did not persist with those 
inquiries when public attention shifted to Joseph Smith’s possible involvement. See 
also Monte B. McLaws, “The Attempted Assassination of Missouri’s Ex-Governor, 
Lilburn W. Boggs,” Missouri Historical Review 60, no. 1 (1965): 50–62.
 107. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, 468–69.
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Nauvoo.108 The City Council then issued writs of habeas corpus for both 
men, and “[u]nsure of his legal grounds, [the sheriff] went back to Carlin 
for instructions.” In the meantime, both men disappeared.109
Various officials continued to search for Joseph for the next few 
months, and Governor Carlin “offered a $200 reward for Joseph’s capture.” 
But the searching ended in December 1842 when Joseph Smith agreed 
to submit to a further habeas corpus hearing in Springfield Illinois. The 
United States District Attorney for Illinois, Justin Butterfield, had been 
approached to act for Joseph Smith and had opined “that the extradition of 
the Prophet was unconstitutional.”110 This was an opinion in which Judge 
Stephen A. Douglas concurred.111 According to Butterfield, the proposed 
extradition was unconstitutional because the US Constitution allowed 
only the extradition of a “fugitive from justice.” Joseph Smith could not 
be a fugitive from justice in Missouri on accessory or attempted murder 
charges since he was in Illinois rather than Missouri at all material times 
and had never been charged with those crimes. While Emma had made this 
same argument to Governor Carlin in two letters in July that year and had 
been sharply dismissed,112 the US District Attorney’s sophisticated version 
of the same argument gave the new Governor, Thomas Ford pause.113 
Butterfield had thus advised Joseph to voluntarily take the matter “to the 
state supreme court, assuring him the justices were unanimously in his 
favor.”114 But ultimately the matter was taken before Judge Nathaniel Pope 
of the United States Circuit Court in Springfield, Illinois, on December 
31, 1842, with Justin Butterfield now retained as counsel. A decision in 
Joseph’s favor was handed down on January 5, 1843.115
 108. Ibid., 469.
 109. Ibid.
 110. Ibid., 479.
 111. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 53.
 112. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling , 474.
 113. Ibid., 479.
 114. Ibid. Also, Walker reports that Stephen A. Douglas had advised Joseph to 
petition Governor Ford to revoke the arrest warrant and reward but went with him 
to discuss the matter further with Justin Butterfield (Walker, “Habeas Corpus in 
Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 53n153)
 115. Note that other authors have dealt with the detail of this second warrant 
case in greater detail than I can within the confines of this article. For example, 
see Morris A. Thurston, “The Boggs Shooting and Attempted Extradition: 
Joseph Smith’s Most Famous Case.” BYU Studies 48, no. 1 (2009): 4–56. Readers 
interested in viewing copies of the original documents may also be interested 
to view them and read commentary in Andrew H. Hedges, Alex D. Smith, and 
Richard Lloyd Anderson, eds., The Joseph Smith Papers, Journal, Volume 2: December 
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Before the matter came before the court, Butterfield was careful to 
satisfy every procedural requirement. Governor Carlin’s old warrant for 
Joseph’s arrest was still in the possession of Sheriff King more than 100 
miles away in Quincy, and obtaining it in a timely manner would cause 
significant delay. So cooperative arrangements were made for a new arrest 
warrant to be issued by Governor Thomas Ford. Justin Butterfield then 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States Circuit 
Court in Springfield, and Joseph was duly arrested by General Wilson 
Law of the Nauvoo militia.116 Butterfield asked the court to issue a writ 
of habeas corpus on the grounds that Joseph could not be a fugitive 
from Missouri justice since he was not in Missouri at the time of the 
crime. Judge Pope set the matter down for hearing on Monday, January 
2, 1843. On that day, Illinois Attorney-General Josiah Lamborn sought 
a continuance to allow more preparation time, and the matter was 
adjourned till Wednesday, January 4th.
Walker has provided detailed commentary on the motions filed 
and the arguments made by both sides in the contest. The procedural 
cooperation of the parties, the decision to try the matter in a federal court 
because of its constitutional significance in the 1840s, and the fact that 
the resulting decision was cited in other habeas corpus cases for more 
than 100 years afterward demonstrate that this event had significance 
well beyond the municipal city limits of Nauvoo. Ex parte Smith in 
1843117 was a test case with national significance. That the United States 
Circuit Court so readily issued a writ of habeas corpus shows that the 
Nauvoo Municipal Court’s issue of a similar writ, four months earlier on 
August 8, 1842, was soundly based on habeas corpus law and practice in 
the pre-Civil War United States.
Judge Pope considered himself called upon to decide a matter of 
wide significance. He explained the US Constitution’s requirement that 
important interstate matters, including extraditions, should be decided 
in the federal courts. He then explained that the protection afforded by 
the writ of habeas corpus against arbitrary imprisonment at the behest 
of the executive, in the spirit of Magna Carta, was of foundational 
1841–April 1843 (Salt Lake City: The Church Historian’s Press, 2011): 194–236; 
and “Appendix 1: Missouri Extradition Attempt, 1842–1843, Selected Documents, 
Introduction,” The Joseph  Smith Papers, http://www.josephsmithpapers.org/
paper-summary/appendix-1-missouri-extradition-attempt-1842-1843-selected-
documents-introduction/1.
 116. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 55–56.
 117. Ex parte Smith 22 F. Cas. 373 (C.C.D. Ill 1843) (No, 12, 968).
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importance to the framers of the US Constitution. This was something 
English that must be retained:
All who are familiar with English history, must know that 
it was extorted from an arbitrary monarch, and that it was 
hailed as a second magna charta (sic), and that it was to protect 
the subject from arbitrary imprisonment by the king and his 
minions, which brought into existence that great palladium 
of liberty in the latter part of the reign of Charles II. It was 
indeed a magnificent achievement over arbitrary power. 
Magna Charta (sic) established the principles of liberty; the 
habeas corpus protected them.
He then confirmed why his federal court had jurisdiction to finally 
settle the matter as Justin Butterfield had advised:
The matter under consideration presents a case arising under 
the 2d section, 4th article of the constitution of the United 
States, and the act of congress of February 12th, 1793 [1 Stat. 
302], to carry it into effect … This court has jurisdiction. 
Whether the state courts have jurisdiction or not, this court is 
not called upon to decide.
Judge Pope then moved to the substance of the arguments behind 
the extradition warrant. He examined the warrant for Joseph’s arrest and 
the Boggs’ affidavit in support, and he concluded that neither provided 
any evidence of Joseph’s complicity in a crime. The highest argument 
against Joseph Smith was suspicion in the minds of others. He accepted 
Justin Butterfield’s argument refuting the “fugitive from justice” claim, 
and then he pontificated upon the State’s paramount duty to defend 
citizen liberty, for as citizens surrender their liberty to the state in the 
interests of law and order, they do so with an expectation that the state 
would protect a citizen’s liberty in return:
Man in a state of nature is a sovereign, with all the prerogatives 
of king, lords and commons … But when he unites himself 
with a community, he lays down all the prerogatives of 
sovereign, (except self-defence,) and becomes a subject. He 
owes obedience to its laws and the judgments of its tribunals, 
which he is supposed to have participated in establishing, 
either directly or indirectly. He surrenders, also, the right 
of self-redress. In consideration of all which, he is entitled 
to the aegis of that community to defend him from wrongs 
… It would be a gross violation of the social compact, if the 
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state were to deliver up one of its citizens to be tried and 
punished by a foreign state, to which he owes no allegiance, 
and whose laws were never binding on him. No state can or 
will do it. In the absence of the constitutional provision, the 
state of Missouri would stand on this subject in the same 
relation to the state of Illinois, that Spain does to England. 
In this particular, the states are independent of each other. 
A criminal, fugitive from the one state to the other, could not 
be claimed as of right to be given up.
Judge Pope then observed that Missouri could have asserted that 
Smith was an accessory before the fact in the commission of a crime in 
Missouri but had not done so nor provided any evidence that would have 
enabled that conclusion. After examining Boggs’ affidavit, Judge Pope 
concluded that Missouri really sought Smith’s extradition on unfounded 
suspicion, and suspicion of a crime was not grounds on which to deprive 
a man of his liberty. He therefore had no option but to dismiss the 
warrant and set Joseph Smith at liberty:
It is not averred that Smith was accessory before the fact, in 
the state of Missouri, nor that he committed a crime in MO: 
therefore, he did not commit the crime in Missouri — did 
not flee from Missouri to avoid punishment … Mr. Boggs’ 
opinion, then, is not authority. He should have given the facts 
… Is the constitution satisfied with a charge upon suspicion?... 
“to say that he was complained of, or was examined, is no 
proof of his guilt; and then to say that he had cause to suspect 
him, is too cautious; for who can tell what they count a cause 
of suspicion, and how can that ever be tried? At this rate they 
would have arbitrary power, upon their own allegation, to 
commit whom they pleased.” From this case, it appears that 
suspicion does not warrant a commitment, and that all legal 
intendments are to avail the prisoner. That the return is to be 
most strictly construed in favor of liberty … No case can arise 
demanding a more searching scrutiny into the evidence, than 
in cases arising under this part of the constitution of the United 
States. It is proposed to deprive a freeman of his liberty — to 
deliver him into the custody of strangers, to be transported 
to a foreign state, to be arraigned for trial before a foreign 
tribunal, governed by laws unknown to him — separated 
from his friends, his family and his witnesses, unknown 
and unknowing … The mis-recitals and overstatements in 
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the requisition and warrant, are not supported by oath, and 
cannot be received as evidence to deprive a citizen of his 
liberty, and transport him to a foreign state for trial. For these 
reasons, Smith must be discharged.
There were two reasons why this should have been an end of the matter 
for Joseph. The first reason was evidentiary. While the charges against 
Orrin Porter Rockwell were not dealt with in Missouri until a year later,118 
there was no evidence that Joseph had hired Rockwell to assassinate 
Boggs. If there had been such evidence, as might have been the case if 
a Rockwell trial had adduced such evidence, then Joseph Smith could 
have been re-arrested on accessory charges.119 But more compellingly, the 
accessory before the fact requisition had now been tested in federal court 
before an independent federal judge. Joseph had been represented by the 
US District Attorney for Illinois (though acting in a private capacity for 
a private client), and the Illinois State Attorney-General had presented 
Missouri’s case after being allowed time for preparation. If Missouri had 
taken the matter further, their mistreatment of Joseph Smith and the 
extermination order against the latter-day Saints may have been brought 
into stark focus. The absence of an evidentiary connection between 
Joseph Smith and the Missouri facts could easily have been interpreted 
as evidence of Missouri’s vindictiveness against the Latter-day Saints in 
the court of public opinion.
The Revived Mormon War Charges
The third Missouri requisition for Joseph Smith’s arrest was based on 
a new indictment for treason issued by the Daviess County Circuit 
 118. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling , 468. Note again that Rockwell was never 
tried for this crime. He was arrested for the crime on March 6, 1843, and then 
indicted and convicted of jailbreak, but the Missouri grand jury found there was 
insufficient evidence “to justify an indictment for shooting ex-Governor Boggs 
[and so] … did not indict him for that offence.” He was released from prison on 
December 13, 1843 (William Ogden Niles, Niles’ National Register , September 30, 
1843, Washington, http://www.sidneyrigdon.com/dbroadhu/MA/nilesre2.htm).
 119. The relevant double-jeopardy provisions appear as Article VIII clause 
11 of Illinois’ 1818 Constitution and Article XIII clause 10 of Missouri’s 1820 
Constitution. Neither an earlier arrest on those charges nor a habeas corpus trial to 
determine whether there was cause to deprive Joseph Smith of his liberty pending 
trial would have counted as a trial as an accessory before the fact, engaging the 
double-jeopardy rules that applied under the constitutions of both Illinois and 
Missouri.
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Court in Missouri in June 1843.120 Hedges confirms that this new 
indictment was a renewal of the old Mormon War charges dismissed 
in August 1839.121 Governor Reynolds, who issued the third requisition, 
knew the old charges had been dismissed because he was a Missouri 
Supreme Court Justice at the time and had dismissed them shortly 
before he became Governor. This requisition should never have been 
issued on double-jeopardy grounds, since jeopardy had attached and 
the case had been dismissed in a competent Missouri court. Perhaps 
Reynolds interpreted the double-jeopardy provision in the State’s 1820 
Constitution as allowing this action because the underlying matters had 
never come before a jury for trial despite the attachment of jeopardy.122 
But for a man who had served as a Supreme Court Justice in both Illinois 
and Missouri, that is unlikely.123
What seems inescapable is that Governor Reynolds knew neither 
Joseph nor his lawyers knew at the time that the underlying indictments 
had been dismissed, and so they did not know (and were unlikely to 
find out) that constitutional double jeopardy was in play.124 Even though 
legal ethics were not well defined in the U.S. in the 1840s, and Governor 
Reynolds may not have considered himself bound to observe applicable 
legal ethics since he was no longer practicing as a lawyer or a judge, 
 120. Andrew H. Hedges, “Thomas Ford and Joseph Smith, 1842–1844,” The 
Journal of Mormon History 42, no. 4 (October 2016): 106.
 121. Ibid, see also Andrew H. Hedges, “Extradition, the Mormons, and the 
Election of 1843,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 109, no. 2, (2016): 
127–47, and Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 
34–7.
 122. Clause 10 of Article XIII of the 1820 Missouri Constitution states:
That no person, after having been once acquitted by one jury, can, for 
the same offence, be again put in jeopardy of life or limb, but if, in any 
criminal prosecution, the jury be divided in opinion at the end of the 
term, the court before which the trial shall be had, may, in its discretion, 
discharge the jury, and commit or bail the accused for trial at the next 
term of such court.
 123. There is also a thin argument that the matter should have been decided 
against Missouri on grounds of judicial precedent, since Illinois Supreme Court 
Judge, Stephen A. Douglas had already decided the same matter previously in 
Joseph Smith’s favor.
 124. Note, however, that they appear to have discovered the dismissal of the 
underlying charges later that year since the Municipal Council passed its nolle 
prosequi Ordinance amendment on December 8, 1843. This ordinance is quoted 
and discussed in the author’s sequel article, “Missourian Efforts to Extradite Joseph 
Smith and the Ethics of Governor Thomas Reynolds of Missouri,” Interpreter: A 
Journal of Mormon Scripture 29 (forthcoming).
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there was nothing honorable about the abuse of process which he twice 
condoned against Joseph Smith. Whether he was complicit in the issue 
of the new Daviess County indictments in June 1843 to try and cover this 
abuse of process is not something that is likely to be uncovered, unless he 
referred to such a plan in correspondence that has been preserved.
Mormon Reliance on Habeas Corpus Review in the 
Nauvoo Municipal Court Did Not Overreach the 
Court’s Chartered Jurisdictional Powers
Governor Ford and Thomas Sharp of the Warsaw Signal had stated 
that the Mormons abused their city’s habeas corpus powers to protect 
Joseph  Smith from legitimate warrants for his arrest. The argument 
that the habeas corpus powers of the city of Nauvoo were an overreach 
appeals to modern readers who do not expect a city to have the power to 
invalidate arrest warrants issued by a state or federal authority. But that 
is an anachronistic assumption. If Nauvoo and the other cities of Illinois 
that were given habeas corpus powers in the late 1830s and early 1840s 
were able to exercise those powers only in respect to arrests made under 
city authority, then those powers would have been redundant from the 
date of their issue. Habeas corpus powers were always controversial 
because judges with modest authority were authorized by those powers 
to hold the exercise of high executive power to independent account. 
Joseph Smith and his colleagues merely applied English precedents of 
this law to similarly evade the abuse of executive power.
The power to grant writs of habeas corpus afforded to the City 
of Nauvoo under its December 1840 Charter was unremarkable. 
Suggestions that this power was anti-republican or oppressive are 
best explained by the agendas of those who suggested irregularity. In 
accordance with Jeffersonian principle in the 1840s, the State of Illinois 
was in the business of distributing power, including judicial power, to 
local people and institutions unless they were incapable of exercising 
that power.125 The Mormons in Nauvoo were no exception to that trend. 
 125. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling , 412. See also Thomas Jefferson, Summary 
View of the Rights of British Americans (Williamsburg, VA: Clementina Rind, 1774). 
Jefferson’s own expression of the modern principle of subsidiarity is perhaps best seen 
when he protested to King George III and the English Parliament that only a body 
elected by the people could exercise its power, which power would revert to the people 
if their elected body was dissolved. Though Bushman says there was little debate 
when the Nauvoo Charter was originally passed in 1840, Firmage and Mangrum 
have observed that one Illinois assemblyman thought it should have been renamed “A 
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Rather, in 1840 the Mormons were seen by the Illinois legislature as the 
very epitome of a people prepared to rule themselves.
Anthony Gregory has identified a decentralized approach to the 
habeas corpus power in America generally when he wrote that even “the 
language of the [federal] Constitution” intended “a lower court power over 
the central state’s detention authority.”126 Indeed, while it is shocking to 
modern Americans to understand that the Suspension Clause provisions 
in the federal Constitution were included to protect state power, including 
state “power to review federal detentions,” this was “a radical states’ rights 
power and was intended as an institutionally diffuse check on federal 
authority.”127 Gregory is certain of this, despite the “common assumption 
that the Framers intended the Suspension Clause to protect the power of 
federal courts to test the validity of federal detentions.”128
James L. Kimball has made a similar decentralization point in 
relation to the habeas powers that were conferred upon the city of Alton 
by amendment of that city’s Charter in 1839. He wrote:
[T]he Alton Charter provided that “the judge of the Municipal 
Court of the city of Alton shall have power … to issue writs of 
Habeas Corpus … with the jurisdiction of said court; and the 
same proceedings shall be had thereon before said judge and 
course as may be had … before the circuit courts of this state.” 
Alton’s court thereby limited the power of the Madison County 
Circuit Court. In Alton and Nauvoo, then, the lesser government 
unit had influence over the greater one, at least for a time.129
The revocation of the Nauvoo Charter on January 27, 1845, was the 
result of majoritarian politics in the greater State of Illinois and confirms 
Bill for the Encouragement of the Importation of Mormons”! (Edwin Brown Firmage 
and R. Collin Mangrum, Zion in the Courts: A Legal History of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1830–1900 (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 1988) 85.) B.H. Roberts also considered it passed easily because all the political 
parties in the legislature at the time were courting the Mormon vote (Joseph Smith, 
History of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints , 7 volumes, ed. Brigham H. 
Roberts, (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1957), 4: xxi).
 126. Gregory, “The Writ Reconstructed,” 64.
 127. Ibid., 63.
 128. Ibid. Gregory goes further and says that the federal “Constitution does not 
actually grant any federal entity with the power to issue the writ. Habeas is not mentioned 
in Section 8 of Article 1, which spells out the powers of Congress, but rather in Section 
9, which enumerates restrictions.” Federal habeas power only came as Congress created 
federal courts other than the Supreme Court and gave them habeas power.
 129. Kimball, “The Nauvoo Charter: A Reinterpretation,” 75.
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only that outside forces had broken down the rule of law in Nauvoo by 
then.130 The fact that the habeas corpus power had been conferred by the 
Illinois State Legislature when Nauvoo was chartered indicates that the 
Nauvoo Municipal Court did indeed have the power to hear and decide 
cases arising within its jurisdiction. To suggest that the Nauvoo City 
Council’s power usurped the powers of the Supreme Court of Illinois or 
of the United States Circuit Court in that state is to misunderstand the 
legal context of the time.
Conclusion
The nature of the habeas corpus power exercised in pre-Civil War 
America had a very English character. As yet, there was only limited 
recourse to the writ of habeas corpus in slavery matters, and its 
development as a post-conviction remedy lay in the future. In Nauvoo, 
as elsewhere in America in the 1840s, the courts followed established 
English practice and used the writ of habeas corpus to review the form 
and the substance of arrests and incarcerations by executive authority, 
including high executive authority where no trial had yet taken place. 
Suggestions in late 19th-century American scholarship that US courts 
were the first to look behind the official reasons given for incarceration 
when prisoners were presented at court following the issue of writs 
of habeas corpus misunderstands or misrepresents the nature of the 
English habeas corpus practice that America inherited. Certainly, the 
availability of this great writ was denied in the colonies for 100 years 
after the remedial Habeas Corpus Act (UK) of 1679 was passed, but as 
soon as independence was declared, the right to seek habeas corpus writs 
was proclaimed by a series of state enactments in completely English 
terms. The right for state courts to seek the writ in federal cases was also 
confirmed when the Constitution was drafted.
Suggestions that the Nauvoo Municipal Court’s habeas corpus 
practice unfairly protected Joseph Smith from Missouri’s extradition 
warrants are also unfounded. I have not discussed the Nauvoo Municipal 
Court’s use of the writ to test the Hancock County arrest warrants issued 
in the wake of the destruction of the Expositor Press. However, the 
suggestion that standard habeas corpus practice was abused or departed 
from in Nauvoo in the earlier 1841–1843 period has no substance. The 
Nauvoo Municipal Court dealt with habeas corpus writs in connection 
with Governor Carlin’s 1842 warrant for Joseph Smith’s arrest on the 
 130. See, for example, Robert Bruce Flanders, Nauvoo: Kingdom on the Mississippi 
(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1975): 228–38.
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charge that he was an accessory before the fact in the attempted murder 
of former Governor Boggs of Missouri, and in connection with Governor 
Ford’s June 1843 warrant issued in respect of treason Joseph Smith was 
alleged to have committed during the Mormon War in 1838. In the 
Boggs’ attempted murder case, the Nauvoo Municipal Court’s decision 
to grant the writ was effectively affirmed by the United States Circuit 
Court in early January 1843 when the court freed Joseph Smith after 
looking behind the warrant and finding the charge was unfounded.
Both Missouri requisitions for Joseph Smith’s arrest on grounds that 
he was a fugitive from Missouri justice in matters connected with the 
Mormon War and extermination order were an unethical business from 
start to finish. While Missouri Governor Boggs may not have known 
that the indictments against Joseph Smith had been dismissed before 
he issued Missouri’s first requisition for Joseph Smith’s arrest, the new 
Missouri Governor Reynolds was well aware, as he himself dismissed 
those indictments at the insistence of the Boone County Prosecutor. 
Reynolds did not withdraw Missouri’s request for Joseph Smith’s 
extradition from Illinois, and he issued a further requisition founded 
on the same facts, even though the 1820 Missouri State Constitution 
included a double-jeopardy clause intended to make such an act an 
unconstitutional abuse of process. While legal ethics on the frontier 
were still developing, it is indisputable that Reynolds acted dishonorably. 
Both Missouri governors who sought Joseph Smith’s extradition from 
Missouri had dirty hands.
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